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Abstract
Algebraic proofs of the cut-elimination theorems for classical and intuitionistic logic are present-
ed, and are used to show how one can sometimes extract a constructive proof and an algorithm from
a proof that is nonconstructive. A variation of the double-negation translation is also discussed: if ϕ
is provable classically, then ¬(¬ϕ)nf is provable in minimal logic, where θnf denotes the negation-
normal form of θ . The translation is used to show that cut-elimination theorems for classical logic can
be viewed as special cases of the cut-elimination theorems for intuitionistic logic. © 2001 Elsevier
Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The cut-elimination theorems for classical and intuitionistic logic are a mainstay of
proof theory, and with good reason. Even when it comes to pure first-order logic, cut-
elimination is a remarkably powerful tool, allowing one to extract additional information
from derivations in a wide range of axiomatic theories.
For the classical case, there is a simple, nonconstructive route to proving the cut-elim-
ination theorem: first, one shows that the proof system with cut is sound with respect to
standard first-order semantics, and then one shows that the fragment of the system without
cut is complete. Together these facts imply that any sequent provable in the system with
cut is valid, and hence has a cut-free proof. Of course, a priori this argument provides no
information as to how to translate a proof with cuts to one that is cut free.
After setting forth the relevant preliminaries in Sections 2 and 3, in Section 4, I present a
natural “constructivization” of the argument just described. The proof is akin to algebraic
proofs of cut-elimination for higher-order intuitionistic logic found in [5,7], and is also
similar in spirit to algebraic model-theoretic constructions described in [2,3,6].
In Section 5, I discuss the algorithm that is implicit in the constructive proof. The de-
velopments in Sections 4 and 5 may therefore be interesting for two reasons: first, they
provide an algorithm for cut-elimination which can be verified naturally in a suitable
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type-theoretic framework; and second, they illustrate a way in which algebraic methods
can be used to extract computational information from nonconstructive classical proofs.
When working with classical logic, it is often convenient to use a one-sided sequent cal-
culus, in which formulae are assumed to be in negation-normal form. This is not really a re-
striction, since traditional two-sided calculi are easily interpreted in the one-sided version,
a useful fact that suggests that in some contexts the negation-normal form representation
is, in a sense, the “right” way to think about classical logic. In Section 6, I present a varia-
tion of the double-negation translation that serves to embed classical logic in the minimal
fragment of intuitionistic logic. Using θnf to denote the negation-normal form of θ , the
translation can be described simply as follows: if a formula ϕ is provable classically, then
¬(¬ϕ)nf is provable in minimal logic. More generally, if a sequent {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} is prov-
able in a one-sided classical sequent calculus, then the sequent {(¬ϕ1)nf , . . . , (¬ϕk)nf } ⇒
⊥ is provable in minimal logic.
In Section 7, I present an algebraic proof of the cut-elimination theorem for intuitionistic
logic, essentially just the specialization of Buchholz [5] to the first-order setting. It will
then be clear that the proof for classical logic given in Section 4 is just a special case of
the intuitionistic version, via the translation above. What is new here, then, is the algebraic
proof of the cut-elimination theorem for the classical sequent calculus; the new version
of the double-negation translation; and the observation that the translation can be used to
interpret classical logic as a fragment of intuitionistic logic, in a useful way. Since the
translation works equally well for higher-order logic, Buchholz’ proof can be seen to yield
a cut-elimination theorem for classical higher-order logic as well.
In contrast, one can also consider normalization proofs in the style of Tait, Troelstra,
and Girard, from an algebraic point of view; see, for example, [1,15]. Berger [4] extracts
an algorithm from the Tait–Troelstra proof of strong normalization, in much the same way
as an algorithm is extracted, in Section 5 below, from the proof of cut-elimination presented
here. It would be interesting to have a better understanding of the relationship between cut-
elimination and normalization, as well as the associated algorithms; Zucker [20] should be
helpful in this respect. Section 8 poses some related questions.
2. Sequent calculi
Though they are not the most natural systems to work with when it comes to proving
logical validities, proof theorists tend to be fond of sequent calculi. On the one hand, using
the sequent calculus with cut, it is easy to simulate natural deduction or standard axiomatic
systems. On the other hand, if one avoids the cut rule, sequents are proved only “from the
bottom up,” making it easy to extract additional information from proofs. In this section, I
will describe the sequent calculi that we will be concerned with below.
To have a uniform basis for the comparison of classical, intuitionistic, and minimal
logic, I will take the first-order logical symbols to be ∀, ∃,∧,∨,→, and⊥, with¬ϕ defined
to be ϕ →⊥. As is common, I will identify formulae that differ only in the names of the
bound variables. If ϕ is a formula and t is a term, ϕ[t/x] denotes the result of substitution t
for x in ϕ, renaming bound variables if necessary; and once a formula has been introduced
as ϕ(x), ϕ(t) denotes ϕ[t/x]. For simplicity, I will work with first-order logic without
equality, though the modifications needed to accommodate equality are routine.
A formula is said to be in negation-normal form if it is built up from atomic and negat-
ed atomic formulae using ∧,∨, ∀, and ∃. Classically, every formula is equivalent to one
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in negation-normal form; if ϕ is any formula, I will use ϕnf to denote its canonical ne-
gation-normal-form representation. The negation operator, ∼ϕ, for negation-normal-form
formulae is defined by ∼ϕ ≡ (¬ϕ)nf . More explicitly, ∼ϕ is what you get if, in ϕ, you
exchange ∧ with ∨, ∀ with ∃, and atomic formulae with their negations. Note that ∼∼ϕ is
just ϕ.
For classical logic, we will use a calculus in which one derives sets of formulae in
negation-normal form, read disjunctively. If  and  are such sets and ϕ is a formula
in negation-normal form, then , ϕ abbreviates  ∪ {ϕ} and , abbreviates  ∪ . The
rules of the calculus are as follows:
, A,¬A
, ϕ , ψ
, ϕ ∧ ψ
, ϕi
, ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1
, ϕ
, ∀x ϕ
, ϕ[t/x]
, ∃x ϕ
, ϕ ,¬ϕ

In the first rule, expressing the law of the excluded middle, A denotes any atomic formula.
In the rule for the universal quantifier, one has the usual restriction that x is not free in any
formula of . The last rule is the notorious cut rule, and proofs that do not use it are said to
be cut free. An easy induction on proofs shows that “weakening” is a derived rule, which
is to say, if  is provable and ′ ⊇ , then ′ is provable as well. Below, we will find it
convenient to add the weakening rule explicitly, allowing one to derive ′ from .
For intuitionistic or minimal logic, a simple one-sided calculus is not sufficient; one
needs to use two-sided sequents of the form ⇒ ϕ, where  is a set of formulae and
ϕ is a formula. Such a sequent is interpreted as the assertion that the conjunction of the
formulae in  entail ϕ. The rules of the intuitionistic calculus are as follows:
, A ⇒ A ,⊥ ⇒ A
, ϕi ⇒ ψ
, ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 ⇒ ψ
⇒ ϕ ⇒ ψ
⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ
, ϕ ⇒ ψ , θ ⇒ ψ
, ϕ ∨ θ ⇒ ψ
⇒ ϕi
⇒ ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1
,⇒ ϕ , θ ⇒ ψ
, ϕ → θ ⇒ ψ
, ϕ ⇒ ψ
⇒ ϕ → ψ
, ϕ[t/x] ⇒ ψ
, ∀x ϕ ⇒ ψ
,⇒ ψ
⇒ ∀x ψ
, ϕ ⇒ ψ
, ∃x ϕ ⇒ ψ
,⇒ ψ[t/x]
⇒ ∃x ψ
⇒ ϕ , ϕ ⇒ ψ
⇒ ψ
Once again, in the first line A is intended to denote any atomic formula, and the last rule
is the two-sided version of the cut rule. If one omits the second axiom, one has minimal
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logic. Notice that the rest of the rules come in left/right pairs, one pair for each connective.
The usual eigenvariable restrictions apply to the ∃ rule on the left and the ∀ rule on the
right.
The two calculi I have presented are most similar to the ones denoted G3i and GS
in [18]. Of course, there are also two-sided versions of the classical calculus: one ob-
tains such a system by modifying the intuitionistic calculus above to allow sequents of
the form ⇒ , interpreted as the assertion that the conjunction of the formulae in 
implies the disjunction of the formulae in . If  is a set of formulae, let nf denote the
set {ϕnf |ϕ ∈ }, and if  is a set of formula in negation-normal form, let ∼ denote
{∼ϕ |ϕ ∈ }. So, writing ∼nf instead of ∼(nf ), we have
∼nf = { ∼(ϕnf ) |ϕ ∈ } = {(¬ϕ)nf |ϕ ∈ }.
The following theorem shows that the classical two-sided sequent calculus is inter-inter-
pretable with the one-sided one.
Theorem 2.1. A sequent ⇒  is provable in the two-sided classical sequent calculus if
and only if ∼nf ,nf is provable in the one-sided calculus. Moreover, there are efficient
translations of derivations between the two systems, with the property that cut-free proofs
are translated to cut-free proofs.
Here and in Theorem 6.2 the word “efficient” means that the number of symbols in the
translation is bounded by a polynomial in the number of symbols in the original. The proof
of Theorem 2.1 is entirely routine: each rule in the two-sided calculus corresponds, under
the translation, to a rule in the one-sided calculus.
3. The double-negation translation
A formula is said to be negative if it does not involve ∃ or ∨, i.e. it is built up us-
ing the logical symbols ∀,∧,→, and ⊥. The following version of the Gödel–Genzten
double-negation translation maps an arbitrary first-order formula ϕ to a negative formula,
ϕN:
• ⊥N = ⊥
• AN = ¬¬A for A atomic
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)N = ϕN ∧ ψN
• (ϕ ∨ ψ)N = ¬(¬ϕN ∧ ¬ψN)
• (ϕ → ψ)N = ϕN → ψN
• (∀x ϕ)N = ∀x ϕN
• (∃x ϕ)N = ¬∀x ¬ϕN
The following lemma and theorem are well known. The first is proved using induction on
formulae, and the second is proved using induction on derivations.
Lemma 3.1. If ϕ is any formula, then ϕN is equivalent to ¬¬ϕN in minimal logic.
Theorem 3.2. If ϕ is provable from  classically, then ϕN is provable from N in minimal
logic.
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If one is interested specifically in translating proofs from the one-sided sequent calculus
to minimal logic, one can prove the following lemma and theorem more directly.
Lemma 3.3. If ϕ be any formula, then (∼ϕ)N is equivalent to ¬ϕN in minimal logic.
Theorem 3.4. If {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} is provable in the classical sequent calculus, then
¬((∼ϕ1)N ∧ · · · ∧ (∼ϕk)N) is provable in minimal logic.
4. Cut elimination for classical logic
The cut-elimination theorem for classical logic states the following:
Theorem 4.1. Any sequent provable in the classical one-sided sequent calculus has a
cut-free proof.
If is a sequent, say that is valid if the universal closure of
∨
 is true in every model.
The next two lemmata provide a nonconstructive proof of the cut-elimination theorem.
Lemma 4.2. The one-side sequent calculus with cut is sound for standard classical first-
order semantics: if a sequent is provable, then it is valid.
Proof. Use induction on the length of proofs. 
Lemma 4.3. The one-sided sequent calculus without cut is complete: if a sequent is valid,
then it has a cut-free proof.
Proof (sketch). Here I will just outline the standard “tableau” construction; for details see,
for example, [9,16].
Let p, q, r, . . . stand for finite sets of formulae in negation-normal form, and read these
conjunctively. We need to show that if  is any sequent and p is the set of negations of
formulae in , then either  has a cut-free proof or p has a model.
The idea is to construct, systematically, a tree of “attempts” at building a term model of
p. Label the bottom node of the tree with p, and proceed upwards as follows. To build a
model of q, ϕ ∧ ψ , build a model of q, ϕ,ψ . To build a model of q, ϕ ∨ ψ , branch, and in
parallel try to build a model of either q, ϕ or q,ψ . To build a model of q, ∀x ϕ(x), build a
model of q, ∀x ϕ(x), ϕ(t), where t is the next term in some predetermined list. To build a
model of q, ∃x ϕ(x), pick a new constant symbol, say “y,” and build a model of q, ϕ(y).
If one is ever called on to build a model of q,A,¬A, where A is an atomic formula,
one abandons the attempt that this branch represents, and hopes that another proves more
fruitful.
Assuming one is systematic enough in choosing, at each node, which formula to deal
with next, one of two things can happen. The first is that the process comes to an end at
some finite stage, because each terminal node is of the form q,A,¬A. In that case, replac-
ing each node r in the tree by ∼r yields, essentially, a cut-free proof of . Otherwise, the
tree is infinite, and by König’s lemma has an infinite branch. The systematic construction
of the tree should guarantee that the union of the sets appearing along this branch, H, is a
Hintikka set: no atomic formula and its negation occurs in H; if ϕ ∧ ψ is in H, then ϕ and
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ψ are both in H; if ϕ ∨ ψ is in H, then either ϕ or ψ is in H; if ∀x ϕ(x) is in H and t is
any term, then ϕ(t) is in H; and if ∃x ϕ(x) is in H, then for some “constant” y, ϕ(y) is in
H. Let M be the model whose universe is the set of terms in the language, and in which
a relation symbol R is true of t1, . . . , tk if and only if R(t1, . . . , tk) is in H. Reading the
variables as constants, it is then easy to verify that all the sentences in H, including those
in p, are true in M. 
This proof is curiously nonconstructive: it gives us no information on how to translate
a proof of  with cuts to one that is cut-free. Of course, if  is provable with cut, then a
blind search for the cut-free proof is guaranteed to succeed; but a priori the nonconstructive
proof gives us no sense of how long the resulting derivation may be, and it gives us no way
of using the original derivation to guide the search. The constructive proof presented below
is similar to the nonconstructive one, but instead of worrying about the models obtained
from infinite branches through a tree whose root is labelled with a set q, we reason about
which formulae are forced to be true in any model obtained in this way. The argument will
then read roughly as follows: if  is provable, then it is forced to be true in every model;
and if it is forced to be true in every model, it has a cut-free proof.
Call the sets p, q, r, . . . conditions, and if p and q are conditions, write q  p (“q is
stronger than or equivalent to p”) if there is a proof of ∼q from ∼p in the one-sided se-
quent calculus, using only the rules for ∨, ∃, and weakening. Put differently,“stronger than
or equivalent to” is the smallest transitive and reflexive relation satisfying the following
clauses:
1. If q ⊇ p, then q  p.
2. If ϕ ∧ ψ is in p, then p  p ∪ {ϕ} and p  p ∪ {ψ}.
3. If ∀x ϕ(x) is in p and t is any term, then p  p ∪ {ϕ(t)}.
The intuition is that if p  q, then p implies q, or, better, every infinite branch through the
tree containing p will also contain q. So if p  q, any model of p (e.g., constructed from
such a branch) is also a model of q. For a concrete example, the condition {∀x ϕ(x),
∀yψ(y), θ, η, σ ∧ τ } is stronger than the condition {ϕ(t1), ϕ(t2), ϕ(t3), ∀y ψ(y), ψ(s),
η, σ }. It is not difficult to verify that the relation  is transitive and reflexive.
The following clauses define, inductively, a relation between sets of formulae p in ne-
gation-normal form, and negative formulae ϕ. Intuitively, p  ϕ means that ϕ is true in
any model obtained from a branch through a tree rooted at p, constructed according to the
recipe above.
1. p  ⊥ if and only if there is a cut-free proof of ∼p in the one-sided sequent
calculus.
2. If A is atomic, p  A if and only if there is a cut-free proof of ∼p,A.
3. p  θ ∧ η if and only if p  θ and p  η.
4. p  θ → η if and only if for every q  p, if q  θ , then q  η.
5. p  ∀x θ(x) if and only if for every term t, p  θ(t).
A formula ϕ is said to be forced, written  ϕ, if every condition forces ϕ.
Lemma 4.4. The forcing relation is monotone: if p  ϕ and q  p, then q  ϕ. Also, for
any formula ϕ, if p  ⊥, then p  ϕ.
Proof. Both claims are clearly true when ϕ is atomic or ⊥. An easy induction shows that
it holds for arbitrary negative formulae. 
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Since any two conditions p and q have a least upper bound, p ∪ q, it is not difficult to
show that p  θ → η is equivalent to the assertion that for any condition q, if q  θ , then
p ∪ q  η.
Lemma 4.5. If ϕ is any negative formula provable in intuitionistic logic, then  ϕ.
Proof. Take minimal logic to be given by a system of natural deduction (see, e.g. [19]),
and show the following by induction on proofs: if ϕ is a negative formula provable from
, the free variables of  and ϕ are among x, and t is any sequence of terms of the same
length, then whenever p  θ[t/x] for each θ in , then p  ϕ[t/x]. The second assertion
of Lemma 4.4 is used to handle the rule ex falso sequitur quodlibet, “from ⊥ conclude ψ”
for arbitrary ψ . 
In fact, Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5 hold for any forcing relation defined by clauses 2–5 above,
as long as the conditions of Lemma 4.4 holds for atomic formulae and ⊥.
Lemma 4.6. If ϕ is any formula in negation-normal form, then {ϕ}  ϕN .
Proof. The proof involves a routine induction on ϕ. I will carry out three illustrative cases.
In the case, where ϕ is the atomic formula A, we need to show that if p is any con-
dition and p  ¬A, then p,A  ⊥. But this follows from the fact that {A}  A, and the
observation after Lemma 4.4.
In the case, where ϕ is of the form θ ∧ η, from the induction hypothesis we have {θ} 
θN and {η}  ηN . But since {θ ∧ η} is stronger than both {θ} and {η}, we have that {θ ∧ η}
forces both θN and ηN , and hence (θ ∧ η)N .
In the case, where ϕ is of the form θ ∨ η, we need to show that whenever p  ¬θN ∧
¬ηN , then p, θ ∨ η  ⊥. So suppose p  ¬θN ∧ ¬ηN . Then, in particular, we have p 
¬θN and p  ¬ηN . Using the induction hypothesis, we have {θ}  θN and {η}  ηN ,
and so p, θ  ⊥ and p, η  ⊥. This means that there are cut-free proofs of ∼p,∼θ and
∼p,∼η, and hence a cut-free proof of ∼p,∼θ∧ ∼η. But this is equivalent to saying
p, θ ∨ η  ⊥.
The cases for ∀, ∃, and negation atomic formulae are similar. 
Lemmata 4.4–4.6 yield a short proof of the cut-elimination theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} is provable in the sequent calculus with
cut. By Theorem 3.4, (∼ϕ1)N ∧ · · · ∧ (∼ϕk)N →⊥ is provable in minimal logic, and so
is forced. By Lemma 4.6, for each i we have {∼ϕi}  (∼ϕi)N . By monotonicity, we have
{∼ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕk}  (∼ϕ1)N ∧ · · · ∧ (∼ϕk)N , and hence {∼ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕk}  ⊥. By defini-
tion, this means that there is a cut-free proof of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}. 
5. Extracting an algorithm
In what sense is the proof in the previous section algebraic? By assigning to each for-
mula ϕ the set [[ϕ]] = {p |p  ϕN }, one can view the forcing relation as providing a non-
standard semantics for classical first-order logic, mapping formulae to values in a boolean
algebra of “regular” sets of conditions. See [5–7] for presentations more along these lines.
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On the other hand, expressing the proof in terms of the forcing relation makes its con-
structive content more transparent. Assuming one has specified a language in which one
can represent basic syntactic notions and operations, for each formula ϕ(x1, . . . , x1) with
the free variables shown, the relationship p  ϕ(t1, . . . , tn) can be expressed with a first-
order formula in p, t1, . . . , tn. Note that the logical complexity of p  ϕ(t1, . . . , tn) in-
creases with that of ϕ, so there is no single first-order formula that captures the notion
uniformly. But for each fixed derivation in the classical sequent calculus, the proof in the
last section can be carried out in intuitionistic first-order logic, using only quantifier-free
axioms governing the syntactic notions. In other words, the argument above yields a meth-
od of assigning to any classical derivation d of a sequent , an intuitionistic proof Pd
that there exists a cut-free derivation of . Normalizing Pd yields an explicit witness d ′,
and a proof that d ′ is a cut-free derivation of . If all one really cares about is the cut-
free derivation (and not the associated proof that it is such), one can instead use modified
realizability to extract a simply typed lambda term Td realizing the existential conclusion
of Pd (see [17]).
The argument in Section 4 used induction on d and the formulae in , so the implicit
assignment d → Pd or d → Td can be obtained using the corresponding structural recur-
sions. All told, then, the full proof of the cut-elimination theorem can be carried out in a
theory that allows a modicum of recursion on syntax, together with a reflection principle for
first-order intuitionistic logic. Alternatively, it can be carried out in an appropriate Martin–
Löf-style type theory, allowing polymorphic recursion over a universe of basic types. Once
again, if one is interested primarily in a procedure for eliminating cuts (and not a proof that
the procedure is correct), one has the following algorithm: given a derivation d, find the
term Td , and normalize it.
The goal of this section is to describe the assignment d → Td in more detail. Suppose
we would like to eliminate cuts from the sequent calculus for a fixed first-order language,
L. Start with a basic type TERM for terms in this language, a type COND for conditions
(or their negations, sequents), and a type DER for cut-free derivations, which we will take
simply to be finite trees labelled with sequents.
Our strategy will be to assign to each negative formula ϕ a type Typeϕ , and specify
what it means for an object of this type to realize the statement “p  ϕ.” Then, given a
derivation d in the classical sequent calculus of a sequent {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}, we will show how
to obtain a term Td denoting a realizer for {∼ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕk}  ⊥. This realizer will be the
cut-free derivation we are looking for.
For the moment, read “type” as “set,” and if σ and τ are types, read σ × τ as the ordinary
set-theoretic cartesian product of σ and τ , and σ → τ as the set of functions from σ to
τ . Take the notation ρ, σ → τ to abbreviate ρ → (σ → τ), and if f is of this type, take
f (a, b) to abbreviate (f (a))(b). The assignment ϕ → Typeϕ is defined inductively, as
follows:
Typeϕ = DER if ϕ is atomic or ⊥
Typeϕ∧ψ = Typeϕ × Typeψ
Typeϕ→ψ = COND,DER,Typeϕ → Typeψ
Type∀x ϕ = TERM→ Typeϕ
Recall that if p and q are conditions, p  q means that there is a derivation of ∼p from
∼q using only the rules for ∨, ∃, and weakening. If f ∈ DER, say “f realizes p  q” if f
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is such a derivation. By induction on ϕ, given a condition p and an element f of Typeϕ , we
can now say what it means for f to realize p  ϕ:
• If ϕ is ⊥, f realizes p  ϕ if and only if f is a derivation of ∼p.
• If ϕ is atomic, f realizes p  ϕ if and only if f is a derivation of ∼p, ϕ.
• f realizes p  ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if (f )0 realizes p  ϕ and (f )1 realizes p  ψ .
• f realizes p  ϕ → ψ if and only if the following holds: whenever d realizes q  p and
g realizes q  ϕ, f (q, d, g) realizes q  ψ .
• f realizes p  ∀x ϕ(x) if and only if for every term t, f (t) realizes p  ϕ(t).
We will now work with a simply typed lambda calculus over the base typesTERM,COND,
DER, with operations for pairing, projections, lambda abstraction, application, and a cer-
tain list of constant symbols, as described below. If f is a closed lambda term, we will say
that f realizes p  ϕ if the object denoted by f realizes p  ϕ. References to the full set-
theoretic interpretation in the definition above is really just an expository convenience. The
proofs which follow depend only on properties of β-conversion and syntactic properties of
the objects denoted by the constant symbols, and so, as noted above, these proofs can be
formalized in a weak theory.
The following is a list of constant symbols that we assume to be included in our calculus,
together with their intended interpretations:
1. For each term t (x1, . . . , xk) of the language, L, with the free variables shown, a constant
tˆ ∈ TERMk → TERM. In the intended interpretation, tˆ is simply a function that maps
terms s1, . . . , sk to the term t (s1, . . . , sk).
2. For each condition p with free variables x1, . . . , xk , a constant pˆ ∈ TERMk → COND.
In the intended interpretation, pˆ(s1, . . . , sk) is simply the condition obtained by subsi-
tuting s1, . . . , sk for x1, . . . , xk .
3. For each k, a constant Treek ∈ COND,DERk → DER. If p is a condition and d1, . . . , dk
are derivations (labelled trees), then Treek(p, d1, . . . , dk) is the derivation with root
labelled ∼p, and with subtrees d1, . . . , dk .
4. A constant Concat ∈ DER,DER→ DER. If d is a derivation of  from  using only
the rules ∨, ∃, and weakening, and e is a similar derivation of  from ,Concat(d, e)
represents the concatenation of these two derivations. In particular, if d realizes q  p
and e realizes r  q, then Concat(d, e) realizes r  p.
5. For each formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) with the free variables shown, a constant Weakenϕ ∈
TERMk,DER→ DER. If d is a proof of  from  using only ∨, ∃, and weakening, and
t1, . . . , tk are terms, then Weakenϕ(t1, . . . , tk) denotes the derivation of , ϕ(t1, . . . , tk)
from , ϕ(t1, . . . , tk) obtained by adding ϕ(t1, . . . , tk) to each sequent.
6. For each k, a constant NewVar ∈ TERMk → TERM. If t1, . . . , tk are terms, NewVar
(t1, . . . , tk) returns a variable that does not occur in any of the ti .
The next three lemmata are the “concrete” versions of Lemmata 4.4–4.6. In the state-
ment of these lemmata, quantification over terms, conditions, and derivations amounts to
quantification over the types TERM,COND, and DER.
Lemma 5.1. For every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) with the free variables shown, there is a
term Monϕ of type DER,Typeϕ → Typeϕ, with free variables x1, . . . , xk of type TERM,
with the following property: whenever p is a condition, t1, . . . , tk are terms, f realizes
p  ϕ(t1, . . . , tk), and d realizes q  p, then the term (Monϕ[t1/x1, . . . , tk/xk])(d, f )
realizes q  ϕ(t1, . . . , tk).
Also, with ϕ and t1, . . . , tk as above, there is a term ExFalsoϕ(p, f ) such that whenever
f realizes p  ⊥, (ExFalsoϕ[t1/x1, . . . , tk/xk])(p, f ) realizes p  ϕ(t1, . . . , tk).
24 J. Avigad / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 49 (2001) 15–30
Proof. Both Monϕ and ExFalsoϕ are obtained by structural recursion on ϕ, and induction
on ϕ is used to show that these terms satisfy the statement of the lemma. I will focus on
Monϕ , and omit references to the variables x1, . . . , xk for simplicity.
Consider the case, where ϕ is ⊥. If f realizes p  ⊥, then f is a proof of ∼p. Then, if d
realizes q  p, then d is a proof of ∼q from ∼p, in which case Concat(f, d) is a proof of
∼q. So we can set Mon⊥ to be λd, f Concat(f, d).
Similarly, if ϕ is a atomic, we can take
Monϕ ≡ λd, f Concat
(
f,Weakenϕ(x1, . . . , xk, d)
)
.
Suppose ϕ is of the form θ ∧ η. If f realizes p  θ ∧ η, then (f )0 realizes p  θ and
(f )1 realizes p  η. If d realizes q  p, then by the inductive hypothesis, Monθ (d, (f )0)
realizes q  θ and Monη(d, (f )1) realizes q  η. So we can take
Monθ∧η ≡ λd, f 〈Monθ (d, (f )0),Monη(d, (f )1)〉.
The reader can verify that we can take
Monθ→η ≡ λd, f
(
λr, e, g f (r,Concat(d, e), g)
)
and
Mon∀x θ ≡ λd, f λy
(
(λx Monθ )(y, d, f (y))
)
,
where y is a new variable of type TERM. 
Lemma 5.2. Suppose d is a proof in natural deduction of a negative formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk)
from negative formulae ψ1(x1, . . . , xk), . . . , ψl(x1, . . . , xk). Then there is a term
Ld
[
u, x1, . . . , xk, z1, . . . , zl
] ∈ Typeϕ
with free variables u ∈ COND, x1, . . . , xk ∈ TERM, z1 ∈ Typeψ1 , . . . , zl ∈ Typeψl such
that the following holds: whenever p is a condition, t1, . . . , tk are terms, f1 realizes p 
ψ1(t1, . . . , tk), . . . , and fl realizes p  ψl(t1, . . . , tl), then
Ld
[
p/u, t1/x1, . . . , tk/xk, f1/z1, . . . , fl/zl
]
realizes p  ϕ(t1, . . . , tk).
Proof. A straightforward recursion/induction on d. For an assumption, just use the vari-
able for the corresponding realizer. For introduction and elimination for ∧, use pairing and
projection; for introduction and elimination for →, use monotonicity (Lemma 5.1), lambda
abstraction, and application; for introduction and elimination for ∀, use lambda abstraction
and application; and for the rule ex falso sequitur quodlibet, use the terms ExFalsoϕ from
Lemma 5.1. 
Lemma 5.3. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) be a formula in negation-normal form, with the free vari-
ables shown. Then there is a term Kϕ[x1, . . . , xk] with free variables x1, . . . , xk of type
TERM such that the following holds: whenever t1, . . . , tk are terms, Kϕ[t1/x1, . . . , t1/xk]
realizes {ϕ(t1, . . . , tk)}  ϕN(t1, . . . , tl).
Proof. Use recursion/induction on ϕ. I will do the same three illustrative cases as in the
proof of Lemma 4.6, and again omit references to x1, . . . , xk . Note, incidentally, that the
function NewVar is needed to handle the rule for ∃.
In the base case, suppose ϕ is an atomic formula A. We want a term taking a condition
p, a realizer d for p  {A}, and a realizer f for p  ¬A to a realizer for p  ⊥. If d realizes
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p  {A}, then WeakenA(x1, . . . , xk, d) realizes p  A. Since Tree0(p) realizes p  p,
f (p, Tree0(p),Weakenϕ(x1, . . . , xk, d)) realizes p  ⊥. So set
KA ≡ λp, d, f f
(
p, Tree0(p),WeakenA(x1, . . . , xk, d)
)
.
Suppose ϕ is of the form θ ∧ η. By the induction hypothesis, Kθ realizes {θ}  θN and Kη
realizes {η}  ηN . Let e0 be the derivation Tree1({θ ∧ η}, Tree0({θ})) and let e1 be the der-
ivation Tree1({θ ∧ η}, Tree0({θ})), so e0 realizes {θ ∧ η}  {θ} and e1 realizes {θ ∧ η} 
{η}. Then MonθN ({θ ∧ η}, e0,Kθ ) realizes {θ ∧ η}  θN and MonηN ({θ ∧ η}, e1,Kη) re-
alizes {θ ∧ η}  η. So we can take
Kθ∧η ≡ 〈MonθN ({θ ∧ η}, e0,Kθ },MonηN ({θ ∧ η}, e1,Kη}〉.
Finally, suppose ϕ is of the form θ ∨ η. We need a term taking a condition p, a realizer
d for p  {θ ∨ η}, and a realizer f for p  ¬θN ∧ ¬ηN to a realizer for p  ⊥. So, sup-
pose p, d, and f are as above. Then (f )0 realizes p  ¬θN and (f )1 realizes p  ¬ηN .
Let e0 and e1 realize p ∪ {θ}  {θ} and p ∪ {η}  {η}, respectively. Then MonθN (p ∪
{θ}, e0,Kθ ) realizes p ∪ {θ}  θN and MonηN (p ∪ {η}, e1,Kη) realizes p ∪ {η}  ηN .
Call these terms g0 and g1. Let h0 and h1 realize p ∪ {θ}  p and p ∪ {η}  p, respec-
tively. Then (f )0(p ∪ {θ}, h0, g0) realizes p ∪ {θ}  ⊥, i.e. is a derivation of ∼p ∪ {∼θ};
and similarly, (f )1(p ∪ {θ}, h1, g1) is a derivation of ∼p ∪ {∼η}. Then
Tree2
(
p ∪ {θ ∨ η}, (f )0(p ∪ {θ}, h0, g0), (f )1(p ∪ {θ}, h1, g1)
)
is a derivation of ∼p ∪ {∼θ∧ ∼η}, and so realizes p ∪ {θ ∨ η}  ⊥. But since d realiz-
es p  {θ ∨ η}, Weakenθ∨η(x1, . . . , xk, d) realizes p  p ∪ {θ ∨ η}; combining the two
using Concat yields a realizer for p  ⊥. 
Putting these together yields a “concrete” version of the cut-elimination theorem.
Theorem 5.4. Let d be a proof of a sequent  in the classical sequent calculus. Then there
is a typed lambda term Td denoting a cut-free proof of .
Proof. For simplicity, assume that  has no free variables; otherwise, we can replace free
variables xi with constants xˆi in the appropriate terms below.
Suppose  is the sequent {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} and d is a cut-free proof of . Use the double-
negation translation to find a derivation d ′ of ⊥ from (∼ϕ1)N , . . . , (∼ϕk)N in intuitionistic
logic, and let Ld ′ [u, z1, . . . , zk] be the term given by Lemma 5.2.
For each i, let ei realize {∼ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕk}  {∼ϕi}. Then for each i, the term Mon∼ϕNi (ei,
K∼ϕi ) realizes {∼ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕi}  (∼ϕi)N . Then the term
Ld ′ [{∼ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕi}/u,Mon∼ϕ1(e1,K∼ϕN1 )/z1, . . . ,Mon∼ϕk (ek,K∼ϕNk )/zk]
realizes {∼ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕi}  ⊥, which is to say, it denotes a cut-free derivation of {ϕ1, . . . ,
ϕk}. 
6. Another double-negation translation
Lurking beneath the constructive proof in Section 4 there is an implicit translation from
classical logic to minimal logic. Here I will make this translation explicit, and in the next
section I will show how one can extend the proof of the cut-elimination theorem to intui-
tionistic logic, in such a way that proof for classical logic can be viewed as a special case.
26 J. Avigad / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 49 (2001) 15–30
Lemma 6.1. Let ϕ be any formula in negation-normal form. Then ϕ → ϕN is provable in
minimal logic.
Proof. An easy induction on ϕ. For general formulae, dealing with implication in the
induction step would be problematic; but the restriction to negation-normal form means
that we only have to consider implication in the context of a negated atoms. 
Theorem 6.2. If a formula ϕ is provable classically, then ¬(¬ϕ)nf is provable in minimal
logic.
Moreover, classical proofs of ϕ in a sequent calculus with cut, natural deduction, or
an axiomatic proof system, can be translated efficiently to proofs of ¬(¬ϕ)nf in minimal
logic, and vice versa. Similarly, cut-free classical proofs of ϕ in a two-sided sequent calcu-
lus, and cut-free classical proofs of ϕnf in a one-sided sequent calculus, can be translated
efficiently to cut-free proofs of ¬(¬ϕ)nf in the sequent calculus for minimal logic, and vice
versa.
Proof. If ϕ is provable classically, then ϕN and hence ¬¬ϕN are provable in minimal
logic. By the previous lemma, (¬ϕ)nf → ¬ϕN is provable in minimal logic, and hence
¬¬ϕN → ¬(¬ϕ)nf is also provable in minimal logic. So ¬(¬ϕ)nf is provable in minimal
logic as well.
We have shown that if ϕ is provable classically, then ¬(¬ϕ)nf is provable in minimal
logic. In the other direction, of course, ¬(¬ϕ)nf is classically equivalent to ϕ. The reader
can check that the proofs of the relevant implications and equivalences in classical and min-
imal logic, using any of the standard proof systems named in the theorem, are polynomial
in the length of ϕ.
As far as cut-free proofs are concerned, one can show more generally that if {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}
is provable in the classical one-sided sequent calculus without cut, then the sequent {∼
ϕ1, . . . ,∼ϕk} ⇒ ⊥ has a cut-free proof in the minimal sequent calculus. The proof is
easy: under the translation, the rules of the classical one-sided calculus correspond exactly
to the left-rules of the minimal two-sided calculus. Then a classical proof of ϕ in a two-
sided calculus corresponds to a classical proof of ϕnf in a one-side calculus, which in turn
corresponds to a proof of {(¬ϕ)nf } ⇒ ⊥ in minimal logic. 
The moral behind Theorem 6.2 is that if we restrict our attention to negation-normal
form, interpreting classical negation as ∼ϕ and interpreting classical implication as ∼ϕ ∨
ψ , then we can view classical logic as taking place on the left side of a sequent in minimal
logic, with ⊥ sitting on the right.
It is worth noting that with intuitionistic logic in place of minimal logic, these facts
follow from a characterization of Glivenko formulae due to Orevkov; see the discussion in
[12, Section 3.2.5].
7. Cut elimination for intuitionistic logic
Let us now extend the proof of the cut-elimination theorem to the intuitionistic calculus.
Take conditions p, q, r, . . . to be finite sets of formulae, not necessarily in negation-normal
form, and say p is stronger than q, written p  q, if p ⊇ q. The clauses below provide an
inductive definition of a relation “S covers p”, between conditions p and finite sets S of
conditions stronger than p:
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1. {p} covers p.
2. If {q1, . . . , qk} covers p, and for each i, Si covers qi , then ⋃ki=1 Si covers p.
3. If ϕ ∨ ψ is in p, then {p ∪ {ϕ}, p ∪ {ψ}} covers p.
4. If ϕ ∧ ψ is in p, then {p ∪ {ϕ}} covers p, and {p ∪ {ψ}} covers p.
5. If ϕ → ψ is in p, and there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ ϕ, then {p ∪ {ψ}} covers p.
6. If ∀x ϕ is in p and t is any term, then {p ∪ {ϕ[t/x]}} covers p.
7. If ∃x ϕ is in p and x is not free in p, then {p ∪ {ϕ}} covers p.
Below I will drop the extra set brackets, and say “q1,. . . ,qk cover p” instead of “{q1,. . . ,qk}
covers p.”
Lemma 7.1. Suppose q1, . . . , qk cover p, and suppose there are cut-free proofs of q1 ⇒
ϕ, . . . , qk ⇒ ϕ, for some formula ϕ. Then there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ ϕ.
Proof. Use induction on the covering relation. In fact, the hypotheses imply that there is
a cut-free proof of p ⇒ ϕ starting from the sequents q1 ⇒ ϕ, . . . , qk ⇒ ϕ. 
Now define the notion of p  ϕ inductively, as follows:
1. p  ⊥ if and only if there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ ⊥.
2. If A is atomic, p  A if and only if there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ A.
3. p  θ ∧ η if and only if p  θ and p  η.
4. p  θ ∨ η if and only if there is a covering q1, . . . , qk of p such that for each i, qi  θ
or qi  η.
5. p  θ → η if and only if for every q  p, if q  θ , then q  η.
6. p  ∀x θ(x) if and only if for every term t, p  θ(t).
7. p  ∃x θ(x) if and only if there is a covering q1, . . . , qk of p and a sequence of terms
t1, . . . , tk such that for each i, qi  θ(ti).
In the following two lemmata, a renaming of variables is just an injective map from
the set of variables to the set of variables. If σ is a renaming, then ϕσ denotes the
result of replacing each free variable x of ϕ by σ(x), changing the names of the bound
variables if necessary, to prevent collisions. Similarly, if p is a condition and σ is a
renaming, then pσ denotes {ϕσ |ϕ ∈ p}. Lemma 7.3 implies that our notion of covering
induces a Grothendieck topology on the category with conditions as objects and an arrow
p
σ→ q for each renaming σ such that p  qσ . (A similar category is used in [3]. See
also the definition of a base for a Grothendieck topology in [11, Exercise III.3].) Lem-
ma 7.4 then follows from the general results of [13], though it can just as well be verified
directly.
Lemma 7.2. Suppose p is any condition, q1, . . . , qk are conditions covering p, and r is
a condition stronger than p. Then there is a renaming σ such that qσ1 ∪ r, . . . , qσk ∪ r
covers r.
Proof. A straightforward induction on the covering relation. The renamings are needed to
handle the variable restriction in clause 7. 
Lemma 7.3. The forcing relation defined above satisfies the following:
1. Stability under renaming: if σ is any renaming of variables and p  ϕ, then pσ  ϕσ .
2. Monotonicity: if p  ϕ and q  p, then q  ϕ.
3. The covering property: if q1, . . . , qk cover p and for each i, qi  ϕ, then p  ϕ.
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Proof. Each clause can be proved using a straightforward induction on the formula ϕ.
Stability under renaming and Lemma 7.2 are needed to handle the clauses for ∨ and ∃
when proving monotonicity. 
An easy induction derivations shows that if there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ ⊥ and ϕ is
any formula, then there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ ϕ. This takes care of ⊥ rule in the proof
of the following lemma.
Lemma 7.4. If ϕ is provable intuitionistically, then ϕ is forced.
Proof. A straightforward induction on derivations, as in the proof of Lemma 4.5. 
Lemma 7.5. Let ϕ be any formula. Then
1. {ϕ}  ϕ.
2. If p  ϕ, then there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ ϕ.
Proof. We can prove both claims simultaneously by induction on ϕ. I will focus on two
illustrative cases.
For the first sample case, suppose ϕ is a formula of the form θ ∨ η. Using the induction
hypothesis, we have {θ ∨ η, θ}  θ and {θ ∨ η, η}  η. Hence, both these conditions force
θ ∨ η; and since they cover {θ ∨ η}, we have {θ ∨ η}  θ ∨ η.
For the second claim, suppose p  θ ∨ η. By the definition of forcing and the induc-
tion hypothesis, there are conditions q1, . . . , qk covering p such that for each i, there is a
cut-free proof of qi ⇒ θ or qi ⇒ η. In particular, for each i, there is a cut-free proof of
qi ⇒ θ ∨ η. By Lemma 7.1, there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ θ ∨ η.
As a second example, suppose ϕ is of the form θ → η. For the first claim, we need to
show that if p is any condition and p  θ , then p ∪ {θ → η}  η. So suppose p  θ . By
the induction hypothesis, there is a cut-free proof of p ⇒ θ . By the definition of covering,
p ∪ {η} covers p ∪ {θ → η}. Again by the induction hypothesis, we have that p ∪ {η}  η.
By Lemma 7.1, we have that p ∪ {θ → η}  η, as required.
For the second claim, suppose p  θ → η. By the induction hypothesis, we have that
{θ}  θ , and so p ∪ {θ}  η. Again by the induction hypothesis, there is a cut-free proof
of p ∪ {θ} ⇒ η. This yields a cut-free proof of p ⇒ θ → η. 
Note that by Lemmata 3.3 and 4.6, with the forcing relation for classical logic, we have
{∼θ}  ¬θN for any negative formula θ . Therefore, if p  ϕ, then p ∪ {∼ϕnf }  ⊥, and
so there is a cut-free proof of ∼p, ϕnf in the one-sided sequent calculus. This is, in a sense,
the classical analog of clause 2 of Lemma 7.5.
Theorem 7.6. Any sequent provable in the intuitionistic sequent calculus has a cut-free
proof.
Proof. Suppose there is a proof of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} ⇒ ψ in the sequent calculus with cut.
Then ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk → ψ is provable intuitionistically, and so it is forced. By Lemma 7.5,
for each i we have {ϕi}  ϕi . By monotonicity, we have {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}  ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk , and
hence {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}  ψ . By Lemma 7.5 again, there is a cut-free proof of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} ⇒
ψ . 
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The proof of the cut-elimination theorem for minimal logic instead of intuitionistic log-
ic requires almost no changes; one simply replaces intuitionistic provability by minimal
provability throughout, and ignores the comment before Lemma 7.4. Theorem 6.2 implies
that the cut-elimination theorem for classical logic follows the cut-elimination theorem for
minimal logic; in fact, the proof in Section 4 is just what one gets if one restricts the proof
above to the negative fragment of minimal logic, replaces “stronger than” by “stronger than
some covering of,” and incorporates the translation in Section 6. In much the same way,
the cut-elimination theorem for intuitionistic higher-order logic described in [5] can now
be seen to provide a cut-elimination theorem for classical logic as well.
8. Questions
What is the relationship between the cut-elimination algorithm described in Section 5
and procedures that arise from syntactic proofs of the cut-elimination theorem (like the
ones in [18])?
It is relatively easy to translate proofs in a sequent calculus with cut to proofs in natural
deduction, and vice versa; and it is well known that, at least as far as intuitionistic logic
is concerned, cut-free proofs in the sequent calculus correspond to normal ones in the
natural deduction setting. As a result, normalization proofs for natural deduction calculi
can also be seen as establishing cut elimination. But methods like those used in [10, 14]
yield additional information, in the form of strong normalization; which is to say, they
guarantee termination for any procedure that follows a specified set of reductions. Can one
say more about the relationship between the algebraic methods above and the methods of
[10, 14]? Can the forcing arguments be modified to yield strong normalization?
On the other hand, more explicit cut-elimination procedures yield bounds on the in-
crease in the length of proofs. In the current setting, one has to extract these bounds from
the normalization procedure used in Section 5. Is there a more direct way to read off bounds
from the algebraic proofs?
In sheaf-theoretic terms, the construction of Section 7 is not quite a sheaf model, but
rather a “modified sheaf model” in the terminology of [3], or a “presheaf model” in the
terminology of [13]. Similarly, the models constructed in [5] are not quite sheaves. Is there
some way that these arguments can be recast as sheaf constructions?
The forcing relations described above can be viewed as providing a metalogical frame-
work for reasoning about search space in a tableau search, in the sense that the forcing
relation makes higher-order assertions about cut-free provability. Can this observation be
put to use for the purposes of automated deuction?
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